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l COUNCILS FOR THE JUDICIARY IN FOCUS
In various European countries Councils for the Judiciary -called 'Councils
for the Judiciary' or 'Council for the Magistrature'- exist. These institu-
tions generally function äs intermediaries between govemment and the
Judiciary in order to guarantee the independence of the Judiciary in some
way or in some respect. Councils for the Judiciary have different compe-
tences in different EU countries. Some of them act äs boards for the ap-
pointment of judges and disciplinary action against judges (e.g. France and
Italy), other administration authorities play an active role in the budgeting
and general (financial and administrative) management of Courts, äs well äs
housing, education, computerisation etc. (e.g. Sweden and Denmark).
At present there seems to be an European trend to establish Coun-
cils for the Judiciary in countries that hitherto relied on ministerial man-
agement and budgeting of the Courts and the Judiciary. This shift has lead
to the establishment of Councils for the Judiciary in Ireland (1998) and
Denmark (1999). The Netherlands are also contemplating the establishment
of such a Council. This contribution reports on some of the characteristics
of various European Councils for the Judiciary. I will especially highlight
the issue of public or constitutional responsibility for the management of
the Judiciary in EU countries that work with a Council for the Judiciary and
the countries that are considering to establish one. In most EU countries
that do not have a Council for the Judiciary the public responsibility for the
management of the Judiciary itself was, until recently, mainly expressed via
and governed by Ministerial responsibility of a Minister of Justice (or of
the Government) to Parliament. A Council for the Judiciary brings about
changes in the former pattern of responsibility-arrangements. It causes
shifts in the constitutional balance of power.
The research reported on here was originally commissioned by the
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Dutch Government. In 1998 the Dutch Minister of Justice wanted a com-
parative study into the position and functioning of different European
Councils for the Judiciary äs an Inspiration for and reflection on their own
plans to establish a Dutch Council for the Judiciary. This contribution
summarizes some of the most interesting elements of the Dutch report.' The
Dutch plans are the stage behind the analyses and conclusions in this
contribution.
2 NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN EUROPEAN MODEL OF COUNCILS FOR THE
JUDICIARY
Although every Council for the Judiciary is the unique product of a specific
development within a legal culture, some general distinctions can be made
among the different Councils in Europe. Some Councils are established
according to, what we can call, the Southern European model of Councils
for the Judiciary. Southern European Councils for the Judiciary are mostly
constitutionally rooted and fulfil some primary functions in the
safeguarding of judicial independence. These functions typically include
advice äs regards the appointment or promotion of members of the
Judiciary, or the exercise of the power of appointment of promotion by the
Council itself, the training and the exercise of disciplinary powers with
regard to members of the Judiciary. The responsibilities and competences of
Councils for the Judiciary set up according to the Southern European model
all have to do with career decisions of (individual) judges.
Councils for the Judiciary fit out according to the North European
model do have distinctly different characteristics. In most cases these latter
Councils rather possess competences in the area of court administration
(supervision of judicial administrations, management of case loads and case
Stocks, Strategie planning, flow rates, promotion of legal uniformity, quality
care etc.), court management (think of housing, automation, recruitment,
training, etc.) and the budgeting of courts (involvement in setting the
budget, distribution and allocation, supervision and control of the
expenditure, etc.). The responsibilities and competences of Councils for the
Judiciary set up according to the Northern European model are not
primarily focussed at the careers of judges but rather on the -effective and
1
 See W. VOERMANS AND P. ALBERS, VERANTWOORDELUKHEID VOOR DE
RECHTSPLEGING; EEN RECHTSVERGELIJKEND ONDERZOEK NAAR DE POSITIE VAN DE
RADEN VOOR DE RECHTSPRAAK IN LANDEN VAN DE EUROPESE UNIE, Ministry of
Justice, The Hague 1999.
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efficient- management of judicial organisations.
2. l Councils according the Southern European model
Examples of Councils for the Judiciary fitted out according to the Southern
European model are to be found in France, Italy, Spain and Portugal. In
France a High Council for the Magistrature (Conseil superieur de la
magistrature) exists since 1946. The President of the Republic chairs this
Council. Furthermore, the Conseil consists of the Minister of Justice (vice-
chairman), twelve members are appointed for four years by and from the
judicial Organisation and the Public Prosecutor, a member of the 'Conseil
d'Etat' and three members appointed by the Head of State. The Conseil has
competences in the domain of the appointment of members of the judiciary
- members of the judiciary are appointed by or on recommendation of the
Conseil by the French President- disciplinary judicial procedure and
promotion of members of the judiciary.
Italy also has a High Council for the magistrature (Consiglio
Superiore della Magistratura). This Council is closely related to the French
Conseil Superieur de la Magistrature and is also chaired by the Head of
State. It consists of the First Chairman of the Supreme Court of Appeal, the
Attorney General with this Court, twenty members appointed by and from
the judicial Organisation and ten qualified jurists chosen by Parliament. The
competences of the Council embrace appointment, transfer and promotion
of the members of the judiciary, the appointment of other persons who are
serving on Courts of justice of the ordinary judiciary, and disciplinary
judicial procedure with regard to the members of the judiciary.
In Spain a General Council functions for the judiciary (El Consejo
General del Poder Judicial). This consists of the president of the 'Tribunal
Supremo' (chairman) and of twenty members appointed, on the recommen-
dation of Parliament, for a period of five years by the Head of State. Twelve
of them come from the circles of the judiciary and eight from that of
barristers, solicitors and other jurists. The competences of the Consejo
concern appointments, training, promotion and supervision via inspection
and disciplinary judicial procedure.
Another example of a High Council for the magistrature according
to the Southern European model is to be found in Portugal. There the
President of the Supreme Court chairs the so-called 'Conselho Superior da
Magistratura'. Furthermore, it consists of sixteen ordinary members, two of
whom are appointed by the Head of State, seven by Parliament and seven
by and from the judicial Organisation. Like in Spain, the public prosecution
is not part of the Portuguese Council. The competences of the Council
include appointments, posting/transferring and promotion of judges.
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Belgium only recently established a Council for the Judiciary.2
Since July 1999 the 'Hoge Raad voor de Juslitie' (High Court of Justice) is
responsible for the determination of Job descriptions for magistrate func-
tions, the development of judicial quality Standards and criteria, judicial
training and the development of training programme's, the issuing of
recommendations on judicial appointments, including the
posting/transferring and promotion of judges, the supervision of courts and
the addressing of complaints. Disciplinary proceedings are not conducted
by the High Court itself, but the Court is responsible for the instruction of
disciplinary cases and the preliminary hearings. The Belgian High Court
consists of forty four magistrates. They are recruited from and elected by
the different Belgian Courts and Magistrates echelons. The Court has a
Flemish division (with twenty-two members) and a French division (also
with twenty two members)
2.2 Councils according the Northern European model
At present, examples of countries where a Council for the Judiciary
functions, set up in accordance with the Northern European model, are
Sweden, Ireland and (soon) Denmark.
The 'fatherhood' for a Council for the Judiciary in accordance with
the Northern European model remains with the Kingdom of Sweden. In
Sweden the so-called 'Domstolsverket' exists Since 1975. This Council for
the Judiciary is set up äs an independent administrative body led by a
director-general. The executive of the Council is under his chairmanship
and further consists of four judges (two Court presidents and two presidents
of Courts of appeal), two members of Parliament, a lawyer and two union
representatives. The competences of the Swedish Council for the Judiciary
consist of, among other, administrative tasks with regard to the drafting of
the budget and the apportionment of the national budget for the Judiciary
among the law-courts, and further the execution of managerial competences
such äs supporting the law-courts in, among other things, the area of
personnel and training management, housing, automation and
computerisation (business administration Systems, jurisprudence databases,
and suchlike), administrative Organisation and bearing the responsibility for
accounting Information concerning the spending of means. In addition to
2
 Established by Statute of December 22, 1998, to change some of the provisions of
part II of the Gerechtehjk Wetboek (Judicial Code) with regard to the Hoge Raad
voor de Justitie (High Court of Justice), the appomtment of magistrates and to
mtroduce an evaluation System (BS 2/2/1999)
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this, the Council principally fulfils regarding the recruitment and
appointments3 of judges.
Since a short time ago (16th April 1998)4 Ireland also has a
Council for the Judiciary (Courts Service).5 The Council is under the
chairmanship of a Chief Executive Officer (appointed on Ist January 1999)
and is further made up of nine judicial members from the different ranks of
the judicial instances in Ireland, the Attorney General, two lawyers,
members from the echelons of the administrative and legal staff of the
Judiciary (clerks office, registrar, etc.), a public prosecutor/district attorney,
a member representing the interests of the clientele of the law-courts, a
member designated by united unions and a juridical expert. The Council
has a number of tasks and competences in the area of the administration and
management of law-courts, including apportioning of the budget, inspection
on and justification of spending of the budget funds by the law-courts, the
general administrative assistance to law-courts, supporting departments for
judges (including the auxiliary personnel), external relations (among other
things public Information), responsibility for housing, taking care of
facilities for clients of the judicial procedure, training programmes,
Provision of Information and responsibility concerning data relating to the
working process of the law-courts, providing annual reports and Strategie
policy plans and -more in general- advising the Minister of Justice in the
domain of the judicial procedure.
Denmark also only quite recently (26th June 1998) voted a Law on
the Council for the Judiciary (Lov om Domstolsstyrelsen), by which,
inspired by the Swedish example, an independent Council for the Judiciary
is being set up. The Council for the Judiciary functions from its coming into
Operation on Ist July 1999 in Denmark. The Council is under the
chairmanship of a director and board of five -independent- committee
members from the different judicial instances (Supreme Court, High Court
and Town Courts), two committee members from the circles of the juridical
staff of the law-courts, and two from the supporting departments.
Furthermore, a lawyer and two committee members with management-
expertise will have a seat in the board of the Council. The director and the
3
 The bureau of office support for the Appointments Review Committee for the
Judiciary that functions mdependently from the Domstolsverket See Appomtment
of permanent judges and the position of the Appointments Review Committee for
the Judiciary and its working method, published by Domstolsverket, Jönkopmg
1997
4
 Date of Implementation of the Courts Service Act, 1998
5
 In Gaelic the Council is called 'An tSeirbhis Chuirteanna'
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daily administration do not have any independent competences, which they
could exercise independently frorn the general executive of the Council.
The Council, in addition to supporting tasks for the Juridical Appointments
Council (a separate body), has competences in the domain of the budget
(among other things making budget proposals to the Minister of Justice)
and the competence, should the occasion arise, to address Parliament
directly if the Council considers the allocated means to be insufficient). In
addition to this the Council has the authority to set up Strategie policy plans
for the judicial procedure, the authority to apportionate the budget funds
among the law-courts, to inspect the spending, the responsibility of drawing
up annual reports and annual Statements of accounts, and a general
competences in the area of the management of the courts (varying from
housing, and accounting to the training of the staff). In addition to this, the
Council will play a supporting role in providing Information and in
automation.
3 LEARNING FROM THE EXPERIENCES WITH OTHER EUROPEAN
COUNCILS FOR THE JUDICIARY?
Councils for the Judiciary are the product of various political and cultural
developments within a legal System, that in turn is deeply rooted in the
historical, cultural and social development of the country involved. Because
of that, every Council for the Judiciary is unique and we can not see or
compare these institutions out of their context. The question thus äs to
whether for example the Dutch government can learn something from the
examples of and experiences with Councils for the Judiciary in other legal
Systems, is a tedious question in more than one respect. In any case, it is a
fact that the examples of other countries do not lend themselves to direct
transfer. The experiences that other countries have had with Councils for
the Judiciary, are very much determined by the specific social and
constitutional context of a country and the cultural development that such a
country has gone through. Every System has found its own balance, via
specific 'checks and balances'. To be able to estimate the value and
significance of a System from outside its own borders a broad knowledge of
the Situation and history is required. In many respects the balance between
the constitutional guarantees for independent jurisdiction and independent
Courts and the forms of public control of the same jurisdiction are closely
interwoven.
That does, however, not mean that for the discussions that are
presently being conducted in the Netherlands, for example, on wether or not
to establish a Council for the Judiciary no Inspiration can be found in other
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European countries. Discussions and developments abroad can contain
important experience-related Information and arguments that can be of
value for the Dutch discussion. Below, I made a brief inventory of matters
and experiences that struck me when I was describing the Council for the
Judiciary. These remarks can be significant äs confrontation experiences for
the Dutch discussion concerning the organization of the Dutch Council for
the Judiciary.
4 THE EMERGENCE OF COUNCILS FOR THE JUDICIARY IN EUROPE
The most remarkable aspect in the country studies made in the research is
that at present in three countries (Ireland, Denmark, and the Netherlands),
new Councils for the Judiciary were recently established or are to be
established. In Ireland, that already happened in 1998, in Denmark the
establishment of the provisional Council for the Judiciary came about in
1999, and in the Netherlands establishment of the Council is being
considered for the Ist of January 2002. This simultaneous advent rests not
entirely on coincidence. First of all -certainly in Denmark- the model of
the Swedish Domstolsverket and the good experiences they had, have been
a source of Inspiration. In addition to this, there are also the
recommendations that Council of Ministers of the Council of Europe made
in 1994 within the framework of Article 6 EVRM -concerning the judicial
independence, the role of judges and the appropriateness of the
administration of justice- that play a role.6 These recommendations do not
require that a country calls an independent board into being, for the
guarantee of the independence of the jurisdiction, but they do demand, for
example, that the appointment of judges takes place independently and that
judicial organization in any sort of way can exert influence on their own
working process. These recommendations have thus partially been the
catalyst. In all three countries (the Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland) a
Situation first existed in which the management and the support of the
Judiciary was entrusted to the Ministers of Justice. From the viewpoint of
guaranteeing the judicial independence -äs it appears from the Swedish
experience- it is considered äs important that the management and the
support of the management take place at a distance. In the Danish, the Irish
and the Dutch plans this is described äs an important advantage for an
6
 Recommendation on the independence, efficiency and role of judges,
Recommendation No. R (94) adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 13th
October at the 578th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies.
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independent Council for the Judiciary. The resistance against the Swedish
Government's plans at the Start of the 1990s, to return certain managerial
competences of the Domstolsverket to the responsibility of the
Government, illustrates that, also after some time, putting these duties at a
distance is still viewed upon äs an important guarantee.
5 NEW COUNCILS FOR THE JUDICIARY BASED ON THE NORTH EUROPEAN
MODEL
Not only is the advent of independent Councils for the Judiciary new, the
package of responsibilities that they have is rernarkable. In the Netherlands,
äs well äs in Denmark and Ireland, it was decided to entrust the new
Council for the Judiciary with managerial and support tasks (varying from
training, accommodation, automation, providing Information, help with
recruitment and assistance to Appointment advisory cornmittees) and
competences in the area of budget, apportionment of the budgets and
justification of spending. Thus not only are increasingly more Councils for
the Judiciary created in Europe, the newcomers are all variants of the North
European model. Certainly to some extent this is due to the success of the
Swedish Council and the example it presents. Through leaving managerial
competences and -certain- budget responsibilities to a judicial
organization, the seif responsibility for the management of judicial bodies
can be extended and with it the efficiency. In Sweden it is stated that indeed
this seif responsibility of the judicial organi/ation in its entirety has
increased by the way the Domstolsverket functions within the Swedish
System. The cause of this greater seif responsibility -äs we can see in
Sweden - is to be found in the presence of a Professional and specific
organization responsible for the judicial management and budget affairs
that acts äs a buffer between the judicial organization and the Government.
This buffer is equally an ally and a guard dog.
A second cause of the larger seif responsibility in Sweden lies
hidden in the combination of independent administration, management and
budgeting of the judicial organization by the Domstolsverket together with
integral management at the level of the Courts. For their operational
management the Courts are very much left to their own devices. The
Domstolsverket promotes, coaches and to a certain extent supervises this
administrative seif responsibility of the Courts. Also in the Netherlands one
has opted for this proved -at least in Sweden- combination of remote
management and integral management. In any case, in Sweden they are
strongly attached to this combination.
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6 CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE QUALITY OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
Councils for the Judiciary contribute to the quality and the effectiveness of
the (system of the) administration of justice, according to those who were
interviewed within the framework of this study. The Northern and the
Southern European model actually express two principal methods to further
the quality of a System of administration of justice.
In the Southern European model this quality contribution takes
place primarily via a system of judicial responsibility for quality that
addresses the person of the judge and his career. With the accent exerted in
countries such äs France and Italy on recruitment, training, evaluation,
appointment, promotion and posting, via the person of the judge during his
or her entire judicial career, the quality of justice administration is moni-
tored by promoting and controlling the quality of the independent judge.
This control is carried out by judges themselves. Via a role in disciplinary
penalties the Southern European Systems also have the possibility not only
to reward but also to reprimand.
The promotion and monitoring of the quality of administration of
justice in Systems that work with the Northern European Council, the
approach usually lies not äs much in the control on judges but moreover in
the material and managerial area. Via the Council for the Judiciary the
attention is constantly kept on the needs of the judicial organizations,
without the distorting influence of the Government. By being able to take
care of direct material needs, to support and to have a central Information
centre, the Northern European Councils try to reach the highest possible
quality of judicial Services by effective management and efficient adminis-
tration. Through the increased efficiency of judicial Services one tries to
increase the quality of the administration of justice.
7 PROMOTION OF THE INDEPENDENCE
An important incentive for establishing a Council for the Judiciary in just
about all the investigated countries is the promotion of the independence of
the Judiciary. This independence and independent Status of the Judiciary is
not the same in all countries. In France the Judiciary does not have a very
high Status, while in Italy the independence of the Judiciary receives a
special Status: there the Judiciary, precisely due to problems concerning the
independence of judges in the (recent) past, has a special prestige. Accord-
ing to the respondents in this study, in Italy the Council for the Judiciary
contributes more to the preservation than to the promotion of the independ-
ence. The favourable effect of Councils for the Judiciary, whether they are
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based on the Northern or the Southern European model, on the independent
Status of judges and judicial organizations manifests itself in all the investi-
gated countries.
8 CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS
Another detail in most of the investigated countries is (the wish for) the
constitutional basis of a Council for the judiciary. In France and Italy the
competence and the position of the Council for the Judiciary are regulated
by the Constitution. In the Netherlands, Ireland and Denmark there is the
intention to do that. The wish for constitutional establishment is normal: a
Council for the Judiciary is an important Institution that assumes an own
role in the constitutional distribution of the State powers. The main aspects
of the distribution of the competences and positions of the most important
State powers in a country having a written constitution should be regulated
in the Constitution.
9 BROADLY COMPOSED BOARDS OF THE COUNCILS FOR THE JUDICIARY
Nearly all the investigated Councils for the Judiciary -with the exception of
the Dutch- are broadly composed with boards of 15 or more members. The
majority of the council boards are composed mainly of judges coming from
the different sections of the judiciary. Some -mainly the highest- judges
are, by virtue of their office, member of a Council for the Judiciary, other
judges are elected by judges from the different judicial ranks. In France and
in Italy the President and Minister of Justice are 'qualitate qua' members of
the board. Differences exist in the non-judicial part of the board, i.e. the
pari of the board with members that are not judges by profession. Usually
these 'lay'-members7 are elected in all sorts of ways by groups of interested
parties at the level of the Court Staffs8, Labour Unions and/or by Parlia-
ment. The broad and representative composition of Councils for the Judi-
ciary in most countries makes it, in principle, susceptible to politicisation
and syndicalism. In different times the correct balance and the correct
relationship between the denominations of the board members can be seen
7
 They are not exactly lay-members in the sense that they are not lawyers most of the
time; most of the time these 'lay-members' in fact are lawyers, but not judges or
magistrates.
8
 E.g. Court Clerks.
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differently or lie otherwise. In order to retain the balance in the vote ratio
within the Council for the Judiciary two Systems exist: first, that of the
appointment requirements (only members who satisfy certain requirements
of professionalism and representatively qualities can be appointed); sec-
ondly, the System of spreading appointment authorities (appointment by
Parliament, by Government or again by others). The latter System is vulner-
able in that that it can cause, for example, a Council for the Judiciary
unintentionally to consist only of judges because, for example, Parliament
only wished to appoint judges. In order to avoid this risk, most investigated
Systems contained a combination of both appointment Systems.
10 'EXTERNAL' MEMBERS IN THE BOARDS OF THE COUNCILS
The foreign Councils for the Judiciary, such äs those discussed here, share
practically without exception the element of the 'layman' or non-judge-
members, who have a seat in the board of the Council (further: external
members). The examples of France and Sweden show that in both countries
the vote of, for example, lawyers, clients and unions in the boards the
Council for the Judiciary is valued. Also in Denmark and Ireland one has
opted for external members on the board of the newly established Councils.
Via the contribution of external members an element of social control is
introduced with regard to the work of the Council for the Judiciary. In most
of the countries however the juridical/magistrates-contingent within the
Council for the Judiciary always make up the majority. The presence of
external members in the Council for the Judiciary can indeed give rise to
much discussion, such äs the example of France shows. External members
can 'politicise' the boards of the Council which constitutes a threat to the
judicial independence. In France and Italy, problems around the
politicisation or the syndicalisation through judicial appointments tend to
be attenuated via the proportions in the board for the magistrature, äs
appears from the proposed amendments with regard to the composition of
the Council for the Judiciary in both countries. In fact, with this the
problem of politicisation and syndicalisation is only confirmed, not actually
solved.
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11 THE COMBINED ACTION OF PUBLIC CONTROL AND THE ROLE OF THE
MJNISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY
The legal Systems described in this study, within which Councils for the
Judiciary function, consist of different mixtures of constitutional Instru-
ments of checks and balances, among which the control via the ministerial
responsibility is usually only one of the Instruments. Compared with France
and Sweden the way in which, via the ministerial responsibility, control is
exerted on the management and the budgeting of the judiciary in the
Netherlands -at least in theory- is very intrusive. In the Dutch discussions
on more independence of the judiciary and also in the discussion concern-
ing the introduction of the Council for the Judiciary ministerial responsibil-
ity is perceived äs the pre-eminent Instrument of control on the functioning
of the judiciary. The question is, however, if the ministerial responsibility
äs a mechanism of control with regard to the budgeting and the manage-
ment of Courts is indeed always such an effective Instrument. That manage-
ment and the budgeting of Courts is hardly a current political theme in most
of the studied countries. The focus of the political discussion between
Government and Parliament is in most cases more concerned with the area
of maintaining the law and prosecution of crimes. That also means that the
ministerial responsibility äs an Instrument of control must not be overrated.
The examples from other countries make it clear that, even if there is talk of
an entirely different, less intrusive, control on the budgeting and the man-
agement of the judicial organizations via the ministerial control, effective
public control on the judiciary is till possible. Examples in other European
countries show that in fact there are different alternative and effective
mechanisms of control, such äs publicity, official control, legal protection
or the supervision and control by a Council for the Judiciary that can
effectively control the way in which Courts function.
12 EPILOGUE
Comparative legal research is äs much fun äs it is complicated. One the one
hand it is interesting to visit and study different legal Systems and analyse
them on the other hand it is very difficult to 'extrapolate' the analysis of a
System and to draw conclusions that bear significance for another System.
Legal phenomena most of the time are rooted to deeply in the distinct legal
and cultural developments to be able to be exported without further ques-
tioning. Fortunately for this research project the Dutch plans to establish a
Council for the Judiciary was not dependent on this research project into
other European Councils. The research results only were an Inspiration and
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Instruments to fine-tune the Dutch proposals. On this very moment the
drafts for the establishment of the Dutch Council for the Judiciary are under
advisement of the Dutch Council of State.9 It is expected that these drafts,
that met with consensus of the judiciary during the first consultations, will
be submitted to Parliament in the Spring of 2000. This means that, if
Parliament approves, the Dutch will have their own Council, rooted in the
Northern European model, in January 2002.
Draft Bill 'Raad voor de rechtspraak' (Council for the Judiciary) and the draft bill
Organisatie en bestuur van gerechten' (Organisation and management of courts)
